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Abstract—The internet of things (IoT) is transforming major
industries including but not limited to healthcare, agriculture,
finance, energy, and transportation. IoT platforms are contin-
ually improving with innovations such as the amalgamation
of software-defined networks (SDN) and network function vir-
tualization (NFV) in the edge-cloud interplay. Deep learning
(DL) is becoming popular due to its remarkable accuracy when
trained with a massive amount of data, such as generated by
IoT. However, DL algorithms tend to leak privacy when trained
on highly sensitive crowd-sourced data such as medical data.
Existing privacy-preserving DL algorithms rely on the traditional
server-centric approaches requiring high processing powers. We
propose a new local differentially private (LDP) algorithm named
LATENT that redesigns the training process. LATENT enables
a data owner to add a randomization layer before data leave
the data owners’ devices and reach a potentially untrusted
machine learning service. This feature is achieved by splitting the
architecture of a convolutional neural network (CNN) into three
layers: (1) convolutional module, (2) randomization module, and
(3) fully connected module. Hence, the randomization module
can operate as an NFV privacy preservation service in an SDN-
controlled NFV, making LATENT more practical for IoT-driven
cloud-based environments compared to existing approaches. The
randomization module employs a newly proposed LDP protocol
named utility enhancing randomization, which allows LATENT
to maintain high utility compared to existing LDP protocols.
Our experimental evaluation of LATENT on convolutional deep
neural networks demonstrates excellent accuracy (e.g. 91%-
96%) with high model quality even under low privacy budgets
(e.g. ε = 0.5).
Index Terms—Data privacy, deep learning, differential privacy,
local differential privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
THE internet of things (IoT) has become one of theessential assets that transform many industries, such as
oil and gas, healthcare, agriculture, finance, and transportation.
The production of a large amount of IoT data has led to
the advancement of different technologies, such as big data
analytics and machine learning (ML), and has opened up
new opportunities. The underlying technologies of IoT are
continuously improving to address complex heterogeneity and
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to improve programmable flexibility. Network infrastructural
improvements, such as the amalgamation of software-defined
networks (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) in
the edge-cloud interplay, are promising better quality of ser-
vice (QoS) for complex IoT-driven applications. Such environ-
ments can be fully utilised using ML to generate efficient and
advanced analytics. However, the server-centric architectures
employed by many ML algorithms limits their integration into
distributed environments such as SDN-controlled NFV.
Compared to traditional machine learning approaches, deep
learning (DL) shows remarkable success in addressing com-
plex problems such as image classification, natural language
processing, and speech recognition. DL models are often
trained on sensitive crowd-sourced data such as personal im-
ages, health records, and financial records. When DL models
are trained on massive databases containing sensitive data,
they tend to expose private information [1], [2]. With the
advancement of distributed, cloud-based machine learning
environments such as those offered by Google and Amazon
[3], [4], more users may become vulnerable to such attacks.
Trusting these environments, users may feed their data to
train the models and obtain white-box or black-box access
to these models without being concerned about the actual
training process. However, an adversary can easily implement
malicious algorithms and offer them as part of the training
process. Malicious algorithms may memorize the sensitive
user information as part of the trained models. Adversaries can
later extract and approximate the memorized information, and
thereby obtain information about the users and breach their
privacy [5]. Privacy inference attacks, such as membership
inference, show the vulnerability of deep learning models
trained on sensitive data even when they are released as black-
box models [2]. Another example that shows the weakness of
trained ML models is model inversion attacks that recover
images from a facial recognition system [6]. It is essential
that machine learning as a service employs sufficient privacy-
preserving mechanisms to limit privacy leaks of trained DL
models. It is also essential that these privacy-preserving ap-
proaches for DL can be used for IoT based applications such
as smart healthcare, IIoT, and Industry 4.0.
In this paper, we examine the privacy issues of deep learning
and develop a distributed privacy-preserving mechanism using
differential privacy (DP) to control and limit privacy leaks in
deep learning. DP constitutes a robust framework guaranteeing
strong levels of privacy [7]. The existing benchmark privacy-
preserving approaches for deep learning are based on global
differential privacy (GDP) [1], [8]. However, we chose local
differential privacy (LDP) over GDP. As shown in Fig. 1,
GDP employs a trusted curator to apply calibrated noise to
produce differential privacy [9], [10]. The necessity of a
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trusted curator makes the existing GDP methods unsuitable for
practical DL services, such as those offered by Google. In such
a scenario, the GDP algorithm should reside in the server, and
the original data need to be uploaded to the server for training.
This approach can pose a threat to privacy, as an adversary can
perform server-centric attacks such as membership inference
and model memorizing attacks. Moreover, DL algorithms are
inherently computationally complex, and privacy-preserving
solutions on DL models also tend to be complex and need high
computational processing power. As a result, GDP algorithms
are preferred to run on high-performance computers, and
resource-constrained data owners can not use them in untrusted
environments. Furthermore, noise calibration of GDP methods,
such as Laplacian and Gaussian mechanisms for DL models,
can be complex, indefinite, and produce less accurate results or
entail a higher level of privacy leak [1], [8]. However, in LDP,
data owners perturb their data before releasing them, which
avoids the need for a trusted third party while guaranteeing
better privacy, as depicted in Fig. 1 [10]. The local approach
to data perturbation in LDP innovates the development of
distributed privacy preservation algorithms for many modern
distributed scenarios, such as those based on IoT.
Our contribution is a distributed LDP mechanism with a new
LDP protocol for limiting the privacy leaks of convolutional
neural network (CNN) models that are released as black-box
models. The proposed algorithm (named LATENT) employs
the properties of randomized response [11], a popular survey
technique that satisfies local differential privacy. The LDP
setting and the layered architecture of LATENT allow privacy-
preserving communication between several parties, which is
not possible with existing GDP methods for deep learning.
We conducted an in-depth analysis of the existing LDP pro-
tocols and devised a new protocol named utility enhancing
randomization (UER) that provides better utility than exist-
ing LDP protocols. We first improved the optimized unary
encoding protocol (OUE) to propose a new LDP protocol
named modified OUE (MOUE), which provides enhanced
flexibility of binary string randomization. OUE is an LDP
protocol that follows the intuition of randomizing 1’s and
0’s differently to improve utility. MOUE achieves improved
flexibility by introducing an additional coefficient α (named
as the privacy budget coefficient) that provides improved
flexibility in choosing randomization probabilities. We then
followed the motivation behind MOUE to propose UER that
maintains the utility during the randomization of long binary
strings with high sensitivity. LATENT can be easily integrated
into modern environments such as SDN controlled NFV by
moving the layer of randomization to run as an NFV service.
As the LDP approach of LATENT enables the control of the
privacy budget before the perturbation process, accuracy can
be effectively tuned independently. In other words, LATENT
reduces the impact of the privacy budget (ε) on the accuracy,
and this leads to significantly higher privacy and accuracy than
what is offered by existing solutions. Compared to current
GDP methods for deep learning, LATENT provides excellent
accuracy (above 90%) under extreme cases of privacy budgets
(e.g. ε = 0.5) that ensure minimum leak. Our experiments
clearly show that a general-purpose computer is sufficient to
perform the required computations efficiently and reliably at
the data owner’s end. Accordingly, LATENT can be a more
practical and robust tool to limit the privacy leak of deep
learning models than existing methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The underlying
concepts used in LATENT are presented in Section II. Section
III explains the steps of the differentially private mechanism
for deep learning. The results of LATENT are discussed in
Section IV. Section V provides a summary of existing related
work. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
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Fig. 1: Global vs. Local differential privacy
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides brief descriptions of the underlying
concepts of LATENT. It includes brief summaries of basic
principles related to "Differential Privacy" and to "Deep Learn-
ing", which are used in LATENT.
A. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a privacy model that is known
to render maximum privacy by minimizing the chance of
individual record identification [12]. In principle, DP defines
the bounds to how much information can be revealed to
a third party/adversary about someone’s data being present
in a particular database. Conventionally ε (epsilon) and δ
(delta) are used to denote these bounds, which describe the
level of privacy rendered by a randomized privacy preserving
algorithm (M) over a particular database (D).
1) Privacy budget / privacy loss (ε): ε is called the privacy
budget that provides an insight into the privacy loss of a DP
algorithm. The higher the value of ε, the higher the privacy
loss.
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2) Probability to fail / probability of error (δ): δ is the
parameter that accounts for "bad events" that might result in
high privacy loss; δ is the probability of the output revealing
the identity of a particular individual, which can happen δ× n
times where n is the number of records. To minimize the risk
of privacy loss, δ × n has to be maintained at a low value.
For example, the probability of a bad event is 1% when δ =
1/100 × n.
3) Definition of differential privacy: Let’s take a dataset
D and two of its adjacent datasets, x and y, where y differs
from x only by one person. Assume, datasets x and y as being
collections of records from a universe X and N denotes the set
of all non-negative integers including zero. Then M satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy if Equation (1) holds.
Definition 1. A randomized algorithm M with domain N |X |
and range R: is (ε, δ)-differentially private for δ ≥ 0 if for
every adjacent datasets x, y ∈ N |X | and for any subset S ⊆ R,
Pr[(M(x) ∈ S)] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[(M(y) ∈ S)] + δ (1)
B. Global vs. Local Differential Privacy
Global differential privacy (GDP) and local differential
privacy (LDP) are two approaches that can be used by random-
ized algorithms to achieve differential privacy. As depicted in
Fig. 1, GDP employs a trusted curator who applies carefully
calibrated random noise to the real values returned for a
particular query. The most frequently used noise generation
processes for GDP include Laplace mechanism and Gaussian
mechanism [7]. The GDP setting is also called the trusted
curator model [13]. A randomized algorithm, M provides
(ε, δ)-global differential privacy if Equation (1) holds. LDP
needs no trusted third party, hence it is also called the untrusted
curator model [10]. With LDP, data is randomized before
the curator can access it. LDP can also be used by a trusted
party to randomize all records in a database at once. The
right-hand column of Fig. 1 represents the LDP setting. LDP
algorithms may often produce too noisy data, as noise is
applied commonly to achieve individual data privacy. LDP is
considered to be a strong and rigorous notion of privacy that
provides plausible deniability. Due to the above properties,
LDP is deemed to be a state-of-the-art approach for privacy-
preserving data collection and distribution. A randomized
algorithm A provides ε-local differential privacy if Equation
(2) holds [14].
Definition 2. A randomized algorithm A satisfies ε-local
differential privacy if for all pairs of client’s values v1 and
v2 and for all Q ⊆ Range(A) and for (ε ≥ 0), Equation
(2) holds. Range(A) is the set of all possible outputs of the
randomized algorithm A.
Pr[A(v1) ∈ Q] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[A(v2) ∈ Q] (2)
C. Randomized Response
Randomized response is a survey technique to eliminate
evasive answer bias by randomizing the responses to a survey
question with the answer "yes" or "no" [15]. An answer is
randomized by flipping two independent, unbiased coins. The
answer is truthful if the first coin comes up "heads", else, the
second coin is flipped, and the answer is "yes" if "heads",
"no" if "tails". Assume that a biased coin is used and the
probability of a user providing an answer truthfully is p
(otherwise provides the opposite of the true answer, with (1−p)
probability). It has been shown that this approach provides ε-
differential privacy when p = eε/(1 + eε) [10].
D. Sensitivity, Privacy Budget (ε), and Determination of the
Probability (p) of Randomization
To quantify the probability of randomization (p, the prob-
ability of preserving an original bit) of an LDP process that
is based on transferring bit strings, we can use the method
employed by Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving
Ordinal Response (RAPPOR), which is an LDP algorithm pro-
posed by Google [14]. RAPPOR is motivated by the problem
of estimating a client-side distribution of string values drawn
from a discrete data dictionary. One application of RAPPOR is
to track the distribution of users’ browser configuration strings
in the Chrome web browser.
Sensitivity is defined as the maximum influence that a single
individual can have on the result of a numeric query. Consider
an arbitrary function f , the sensitivity ∆ f of f can be given
as in Equation (3) where x and y are two neighboring datasets
and ‖.‖1 represents the L1 norm of a vector [16].
∆ f = max{‖ f (x) − f (y)‖1} (3)
Since RAPPOR is an LDP algorithm, it considers x and y
to be a pair of adjacent inputs in RAPPOR’s definition of
global sensitivity. In RAPPOR any input vi is encoded as a
vector of d bits, and each d-bit vector contains d − 1 zeros
and 1 one, so the maximum difference, ∆ f (the sensitivity)
between two adjacent vectors, is 2 bits. In other words, the
underlying data representation of RAPPOR, f has a sensitivity
of 2. RAPPOR is an LDP algorithm when the probability p of
preserving the true value of an original bit in randomization
follows Equation (4), where ε is the privacy budget offered
by the LDP process [14], [17].
p =
e
ε
∆ f
1 + e
ε
∆ f
=
e
ε
2
1 + e ε2
(4)
E. Properties of Differential Privacy
Postprocessing invariance/robustness, quantifiability, and
composition are three of the essential characteristics of dif-
ferential privacy [18]. Although additional computations are
carried out on the outcome of a differentially private algorithm,
they do not weaken the privacy guarantee. So, the results
of additional computations on ε-DP outcome will still be ε-
DP. This property of DP is called the postprocessing invari-
ance/robustness. Quantifiability is the ability of DP scenarios
to provide transparency in calculating the precise amount of
perturbation applied by a particular randomization process.
Thus, the user of a particular DP algorithm knows the level of
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privacy provided by the data/results released after perturbation.
Composition is the degradation of privacy when multiple
differentially private algorithms are performed on the same or
overlapping datasets [18]. According to DP definitions, when
two DP algorithms ε1-DP and ε2-DP are applied to the same
or overlapping datasets, the union of the results is equal to
(ε1 + ε2)-DP [18]. The more DP algorithms are applied to the
same data, the more privacy loss is accumulated. Depending
on the process of synthesis, DP algorithms can be categorized
into the two types; basic algorithms or derived algorithms [19].
Differential privacy is self-contained in basic algorithms while
the derived algorithms are derived from existing methods
by applying the theories of composition and postprocessing
invariance.
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Fig. 2: Generic architecture of a convolutional neural network
F. Deep Learning Using Convolutional Neural Networks
A CNN is commonly trained to recognize essential features
of images. As shown in Fig. 2, a CNN uses a collection of
layers named convolution layers with large receptive fields.
A sequence of steps through this stack of convolution layers
is followed by an intermediate functionality called pooling to
reduce the dimensions from the previous layer to the next
layer. The final pooled output which is produced from the
last convolution layer is flattened to produce a sizeable 1-D
vector [20]. Then a fully connected artificial neur l network
(ANN) is trained using these input vectors to generate pre-
dictions (classifications) on the inputs (images). An ANN is
more or less a connected network of processing modules called
neurons, each producing a sequence of real-valued activations.
Overfitting happens when the training accuracy is signifi-
cantly higher than the testing accuracy [20], [21]. Good quality
models avoid overfitting. Regularization, image augmentation,
and hyperparameter tuning are three of the commonly used
concepts to avoid overfitting and improve the performance
and robustness of neural networks [20], [21]. Regularization
is the process of applying any modification to a learning
algorithm to reduce the generalization error. Regularization
can be achieved using dropouts, where a certain percentage of
neurons are randomly dropped in each epoch (training cycle)
to avoid overfitting. Image augmentation is a data preparation
technique, which uses the existing input images in the training
dataset and manipulates them to create many altered versions
of the same input using different transformation methods
such as reflection, sheer, and rotation. This technique allows
an ANN to learn a wider variety of inputs to make the
trained model more generalizable with high robustness [22]. In
hyperparameter tuning the inputs to hyperparameters such as
percentage dropouts, batch size, activation functions, number
of neurons, number of epochs, and optimizer are changed
under different training phases to identify the best case study
that returns the best results [20], [21]. Batch size is the
number of training examples that are going to be propagated in
one forward/backward pass [21]. Activation functions define
the output of a particular neuron given a set of inputs that,
with corresponding weights, introduce non-linear properties
to the network [20]. A neuron (also called a node) is the
primary component of an artificial neural network. A single
pass in which the entire dataset is introduced forward and
backward through the neural network is called an epoch [20].
An optimizer (or an optimization algorithm) is used to update
the model parameters such as weights and bias values [20]
G. Amalgamation of SDN and NFV in Edge-Cloud Interplay
SDN and NFV are two types of programmable infrastruc-
tures that improve the versatility of networking. Both technolo-
gies work based on the concept of creating virtual instances
for network functionalities where SDN virtualizes controlling
aspects, and NFV virtualizes essential network functions such
as encrypting channels. The amalgamation between SDN and
NFV can bring forward many advanced capabilities in terms
of flexibility, efficiency, and quality of service with increased
reconfigurability. SDN-controlled NFV can introduce a series
of virtualizations that can benefit the edge-cloud interplay,
which can improve the security and quality of service of
communication between local devices and cloud servers [23],
[24].
III. OUR APPROACH: LATENT
This section discusses the differentially private mechanism
employed in LATENT for deep learning. LATENT can be
classified as a derived differentially private algorithm which
is based on the randomized response technique. LATENT
uses two properties of differential privacy: postprocessing
invariance and composition when applying differential privacy
to a CNN. LATENT uses regularization, image augmenta-
tion, and hyperparameter tuning to optimize its performance
under noisy input conditions in the randomization process.
We implemented and tested LATENT on convolutional neural
networks using the Python Keras neural networks API, which
runs on top of the TensorFlow dataflow engine developed by
Google [3], [25]. Keras provides a high-level neural-network
API designed primarily for fast experimentation.
A. Introduction of the Intermediate Layer (LATENT) to Inject
Differential Privacy into the CNN Architecture
As shown in Fig. 3, we divide the structure of a convolu-
tional neural network into two main modules, and introduce an
intermediate module of randomization into the CNN structure.
Recall (described in Section II-F) that in CNN, the input
features are initially subjected to dimensionality reduction,
using a collection of convolutional layers and pooling layers.
The output of the final pooling layers is flattened into a single
1-D array before feeding it to a fully connected artificial neural
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network. We call this part of a CNN the convolutional module,
and we name the fully connected network component of the
CNN as the FC module. We insert the randomization layer
named LATENT between the convolutional module and the
FC module, as shown in Fig. 3. In the proposed architecture
we use the convolutional module only to generate the 1-D
flattened output that corresponds to a particular image input.
This flattened output is simply a one-dimensional column
vector of float values (real-valued numbers).
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1) Apply z-score normalization to LATENT’s input values:
LATENT converts the input values to binary values before ran-
domization. The inputs can have different ranges. Conversion
of large values or small fractions into binary can involve a
large number of bits. This can introduce an inconsistent level
of complexity to the algorithm. To avoid this complexity, we
apply z-score normalization to the values of the 1-D vector
coming from the flattening layer.
2) Define the bounds (lengths of the segments) for the
binary conversion: The length of the bit pattern establishes
the range of a particular z-score normalized input. The upper
bound and the lower bound of a specific input need to be
initially estimated. Fig. 4 shows the arrangement of bits of
the binary conversion of a z-score normalized input. As shown
in the figure, there are three primary segments of the binary
string. The first bit represents the sign of the input (1 for
negative and 0 for positive). The other two parts are for
the whole number and the fraction part of an input number
respectively. Selection of the number of bits for the whole
number depends on the maximum value of the whole number
that needs to be represented. Due to z-score normalization,
the number of bits necessary to represent the whole number is
small. Selection of the number of bits for the fraction depends
on the precision (how close is the binary fraction’s decimal
value to the input’s fraction value). For more precision, a
higher number of bits needs to be used for the fraction.
3) Convert each value of the flattened layer to binary using
the bounds: After determining the length of the components
of binary strings of the inputs, the inputs can be mapped
as shown in Fig. 4. The figure shows the direct mapping of
an integer/float value to its binary representation. The binary
representation can be generated according to Equation (5),
where n and m are the numbers of binary digits of the whole
number and the fraction respectively, x represents the original
input value where x ∈ R, and g(i) represents the ith bit of
the binary string where the least significant bit is represented
when k = −m. The sign bit is 1 for negative values and 0 for
positive values. The sign bit is assigned to the most significant
bit of the binary string.
±x. y sign bit whole number fraction
10 1... 0 0 1 ...0
2-1 2-2 2-3202122 2-m2n
± x y
Fig. 4: Direct mapping of a float/integer to binary
g(i) =
( ⌊
2−k |x |
⌋
mod 2
)n
k=−m
where, i = k + m (5)
4) Merge the binary strings to reduce the privacy loss:
We merge all the binary strings into one long binary string
to avoid privacy loss due to the composition property of
differential privacy. If we conducted the randomization on
each binary string corresponding to the flattened 1-D vector
separately, it would add up the privacy budgets of all the
randomization steps. If r binary strings were randomized, the
resulting privacy loss of the final randomization would be
r ×ε. As LATENT conducts the randomization on a particular
merged binary string at once, we can maintain the privacy loss
at the input value of ε.
5) Define the probability of randomization (p) in terms of
ε: The probability of randomization p (i.e. the probability
of preserving the true value of an original bit) is calculated
in terms of the privacy budget (ε) before the randomization
of the merged binary string. Recall that in the randomized
response technique (as described in Section II-D) used in
RAPPOR, when the difference of the number of bits of two
neighboring inputs is d, the sensitivity becomes d. In the case
of LATENT, the length of a binary string is l = (n + m + 1)
which makes the length of the merged binary string equal to
l×r where r is the number of outputs of the flattening layer of
the convolutional module. According to our method of binary
conversion, two consecutive inputs can differ by at most of l×r
bits. Consequently, LATENT has a sensitivity of l × r . Now,
we can represent the probability of randomization according to
Equation (6). We note that merging the binary strings together
increases sensitivity, hence, makes increasing the amount of
randomization necessary.
p =
eε/rl
1 + eε/rl
(6)
6) Modifying optimized unary encoding to improve utility:
As discussed in Section III-A5, the probability of randomiza-
tion in reporting opposite of the true bits is (1 − p) = 11+eε/r l .
However, this can introduce an unreliable level of random-
ization to the output of the LATENT layer, as the sensitivity
= rl is extensive, as discussed in Section III-A5. To improve
the utility, we follow the intuition behind Optimized Unary
Encoding (OUE) [26]. OUE perturbs 0 and 1 differently to
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reduce the probability of perturbing 0 to 1 (p0→1) as there are
considerably more 0’s than 1’s when the input binary string
is long. We propose a new approach to further optimize the
selection of probabilities of randomization, which can provide
enhanced utility when the bit strings are long.
Let vi represent an instance in the database and B is a d
bit binary encoded version of vi . B[i] represents the ith bit
and B′[i] is the perturbed ith bit. Assume that, only the j th
position of B is set to 1, whereas the other bits are set to zero.
Unary Encoding (UE) [14] perturbs the bits of B according to
Eq. 7.
Pr
[
B′[i] = 1] = { p, if B[i] = 1q, if B[i] = 0 (7)
UE satisfies ε-LDP [14], [26] for,
ε = ln
(
p(1 − q)
(1 − p)q
)
(8)
This can be proven (refer to Appendix A) as done in
[14], [26] for any inputs v1, v2, and B with sensitivity = 2.
Utilizing the concept of UE, optimized unary encoding (OUE)
in its optimal setting sets p = 12 and q =
1
1+eε , so that the
randomization improves the budget allocation for transmitting
the 0 bits in their original state as much as possible. According
to Eq.8, we can show that OUE provides ε-LDP when p = 12 ,
q = 11+eε , and sensitivity = 2 (refer to Appendix B for proof).
When the sensitivity is high, the bit strings will have many
1s. In such a scenario (such as in LATENT), more flexibility
for controlling the randomization of 1s is also essential to
generate better utility. Following this intuition, we propose
the Upper Bound (UB) Theorem III.1. In UB theorem, we
consider a coefficient (α, the privacy budget coefficient) during
the probability selection. This model provides εub-LDP where
εub = ln(α2eε).
Theorem III.1. (Upper bound (UB) theorem)
Let UB(ε) be the upper bound of the privacy budget when the
sensitivity = 2. Let the perturbation probabilities, p = αe
ε
2
1+αe
ε
2
and q = 1
1+αe
ε
2
. Then UB(ε)) = ln (α2eε), where α is the
privacy budget coefficient (refer to Appendix C for proof).
We can extend the idea in the UB theorem and use the
privacy budget coefficient (α) to modify OUE as defined
in Theorem III.2; α provides more flexibility to MOUE in
choosing the randomization probabilities. By increasing α, we
can increase the probability of transmitting the 0 bits in their
original state.
Theorem III.2. (Modified OUE (MOUE))
For any inputs v1,v2 in MOUE, Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= 11+α ,
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
= α1+α , Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v1
]
= αe
ε
1+αeε ,
Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v2
]
= 11+αeε . Then, MOUE provides ε-LDP
(refer to Appendix D for proof).
MOUE is suitable for randomizing bit strings, which has a
considerable number of 1s along with a large number of 0s
such as in LATENT. Theorem III.3 defines the probabilities for
cases where the sensitivity is considerably large. Preserving as
much 0s as possible will allow the utility to be preserved while
tolerating an anticipated loss in the probability of preserving
the original 1.
Theorem III.3. (MOUE for high sensitivities)
MOUE for LATENT provides ε-LDP, when
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= 11+α , Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
= α1+α ,
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
= αe
ε
r l
1+αe
ε
r l
, Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v2
]
= 1
1+αe
ε
r l
(refer to Appendix E for proof).
7) Improving the utility of randomized binary strings:
Although MOUE improves the utility of randomized output, it
can also massively increase the randomization of 1’s when α
is large. MOUE improves the probabilities of randomization
by randomizing 1 and 0 differently following the intuition
behind OUE. By further extending this idea, we apply two
randomization models over the bits of a binary string to
enhance the utility of randomized binary strings. In this way,
we try to randomize half of the bits in the bit string differently
compared to the other half as defined in Theorem III.4.
When α is increased, UER will increase the probability of
preserving 0s in their original state. However, the probability
of preserving 1s in their original state increases for half of
the string while the corresponding probability decreases for
the other half of the string. In this way, UER maintains the
privacy budget at  .
Theorem III.4. (Utility enhancing randomization (UER))
Let p(B[i]v) be the probability of randomizing the ith bit of
the binary encoded string of v. For any inputs v1, v2 with a
sensitivity = rl, define the probability, p(B[i]v) as in Eq. 9.
Then the randomization provides -LDP (refer to Appendix F
for proof).
p(B[i]v) =

Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= α1+α if i ∈ 2n; n ∈ N
Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v1
]
= αe
ε
r l
1+αe
ε
r l
”
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= 11+α3 if i ∈ 2n + 1
Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v1
]
= αe
ε
r l
1+αe
ε
r l
”
(9)
8) Conduct UER on the bits of the merged binary strings:
Each bit in the merged binary string is subjected to MOUE,
given in Equation (6). The higher the p is, the lower the
randomization of the binary string will be. According to
Equation (6), higher ε values and lower l × r values will
result in higher p values. In LATENT, l × r is a considerably
larger value than ε, p is often a smaller value. MOUE allows
LATENT to fine-tune the probabilities of randomization by
calibrating α. By increasing α to be greater than 5, MOUE
decreases the probability of perturbing 0 to 1. This feature of
MOUE helps LATENT to maintain the utility as there are a
large number of 0’s compared to 1’s in binary encoded inputs
of LATENT. However, this reduces the probability of releasing
the real bits when the input bit is 1 for half of the bits in the
input bit strings. Compared to RAPPOR, a binary string in
LATENT has many 1’s. As a result of that, LATENT can
tolerate this loss of probability. Consequently, UER allows
changing the amount of randomization of the input bits by
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, VOL. XX, NO. XX 7
changing α while maintaining the same privacy budget.
.
9) Generate a differentially private classification model
using the FC module: After randomizing the merged binary
strings, LATENT feeds the randomized binary strings into the
FC module of the convolutional network. The FC module
is then trained on the randomized binary strings to generate
a differentially private ANN model (DPFC module). We
improve the performance of the differentially private model
using regularization, image augmentation, and hyperparameter
tuning.
B. Algorithm for Generating a Differentially Private CNN
Algorithm 1 shows the steps of LATENT in producing a
differentially private output. It provides the sequence of steps
of applying differential privacy to the CNN architecture, as
explained in Section III-A .
Algorithm 1: Differentially private model generation
Input:
{x1, . . . , xj} ← examples
ε ← privacy budget
n ← number of bits for the whole
number of the binary
representation
m ← number of bits for the fraction
of the binary representation
α ← privacy budget coefficient
Output: DPCNN ← differentially private CNN model
1 Define the convolutional module (CNM) as explained in
Section III-A;
2 Declare, l = (m + n + 1);
3 Feed {x1, . . . , xj} to the CNM and generate the sequence of
1-D feature arrays {d1, . . . , dj};
4 Convert each field (x) of dq (where, q = 1, . . . , j) to binary
using, g(i) =
( ⌊
2−k |x |
⌋
mod 2
)n
k=−m
where, i = k + m;
5 Generate array {b1, . . . , bj} of the merged binary arrays for the
elements in {d1, . . . , dj};
6 Determine the length (r) of a single element of {d1, . . . , dj};
7 Calculate randomization probability according to Eq. 9;
8 Randomize each element of {b1, . . . , bj} using UER (refer
Theorem III.4) with probability p to generate {pb1, . . . , pbj};
9 Train the FC module of the CNN using {pb1, . . . , pbj} ;
10 Optimize the FC module using regularization, image
augmentation and/or hyperparameter tuning;
11 Return the DPFC module;
C. The LDP Settings for LATENT
Since the randomization takes place after the convolutional
module, we push the convolutional module and the LATENT
module to the data owner’s end as shown in Fig. 5. The DPFC
module is trained at the untrusted curator’s end, and can be
executed on a cloud computer or on any high-performance
computing server. The model release will involve the release
of only the trained DPFC module which can be used for testing
by any third party. In the proposed setting, the convolutional
module is not trained for features, leaving a minimum com-
putational burden on a particular data owner.
Convolutional
Module LATENT
DP
FC
Module
Data Owner
Data
Untrusted Curator Public Cloud
Trained
DP-ANN
Perturbed Data
Fig. 5: LDP configurations of LATENT
The proposed component distribution of the CNN architec-
ture, which moves the convolutional module to the data owner,
produces additional privacy even before the randomization, as
the output of the CNN module is a dimension-reduced 1-D
vector. Additionally, in the big data context where millions
of data owners communicate with the server, our CNN model
distribution can provide additional flexibility and efficiency in
data processing, leaving the FC module to train on the already
dimension-reduced data.
DP
output
Local IoT
Local IoT
Local IoT
Convolutional 
Module
Convolutional 
Module
Convolutional 
Module
Local Edge
LATENT
NFV
Transport 
Network
Cloud Server
DP
FC
Module
SDN CONTROLLER
LATENT
LATENT
Fig. 6: Integration of LATENT with SDN and NFV in edge-
cloud interplay
However, we can also push the whole DP CNN architecture
to a single machine where we keep a central repository that is
maintained by a trusted curator. Then we can apply the CNN
with LATENT on the dataset at the trusted curator’s end where
the model will be released with the whole architecture of
the CNN (Convolutional module (untrained)+LATENT+DPFC
module).
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D. Integrating LATENT in the Amalgamation of SDN and
NFV in Edge-Cloud Interplay
We can distribute the layers in LATENT (refer Fig. 3) in an
SDN+NFV setting, as shown in Fig. 6. In this configuration,
the first two layers of Fig. 6 will reside at the local edge. First,
the output from local IoT will go through the Convolutional
module. The randomization layer will run as an NFV service
which applies the randomization to the outputs from the convo-
lutional modules. Consequently, the public transport layer will
receive a randomized version of the input data and pass them
on to the DPFC module in the cloud server, which produces
a differentially private output. One or more SDN controllers
will control the whole communication setup, as shown in Fig.
6.
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Fig. 7: Architectural differences between the non-private
(NPCNN) and differentially private (DPCNN) baseline models
for the handwriting recognition dataset (MNIST dataset)
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the experiments, experimental
configurations, and their results. We tested our method using
the MNIST dataset [27] and the CIFAR-10 dataset [1] which
are considered to be the benchmark datasets to train and
test deep learning (CNN) algorithms. We specifically selected
MNIST and CIFAR-10 for the experiments as they have been
used in recent works on deep learning with differential pri-
vacy [1], [8]. MNIST is famous for generating good accuracy
in deep learning, whereas CIFAR-10 is a complex dataset and
is difficult for training. These complementary properties of
MNIST and CIFAR-10 provide a balanced experimental setup
to test the performance of a specific deep learning scenario.
We conducted all experiments on an HPC cluster (SUSE
Linux Enterprise Server 12 SP3) with 112 Dual Xeon 14-
core E5-2690 v4 Compute Nodes each with 256 GB of RAM,
FDR10 InfiniBand interconnect, and 4 NVidia Tesla P100
(SXM2). The computational complexity and the computational
burden of LATENT on resource-constrained data owners was
evaluated using a general purpose Intel Core i5 computer. A
comprehensive specification of the corresponding computer is
provided in Section IV-C.
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Fig. 8: Architectural differences between the baseline models
(NPCNN and DPCNN) for image recognition of the CIFAR-
10 dataset
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A. Experimental Setup
First, we created suitable baseline CNN models for each
dataset. The baseline models include CNN without differential
privacy (NPCNN) and a differentially private version of the
same configuration (DPCNN). Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 show the
baseline CNN architectures defined for the MNIST dataset
and the CIFAR-10 datasets respectively. In the figures, the
left-hand side models represent the NPCNN. The right-hand
side models are the differentially private versions (DPCNN)
of the corresponding left-hand side models. First we tested
the accuracy of the NPCNN models, then we tested the
DPCNN models’ performance relative to NPCNN models,
and conducted hyperparameter tuning and image augmentation
on the DPCNN models to improve performance. Finally, the
results of the best DPCNN models were chosen to compare
the results with other existing differentially private methods
for deep learning.
1) Datasets and CNN model information: This section
provides information about the datasets and the architectures
of the corresponding CNN models used in the experiments.
The architecture of a CNN needs to be custom configured, as
the performance depends on the characteristics of the input
dataset. The model quality of the trained ANN depends on
the correct configuration of its network architecture [20]. As
explained below, we declared suitable CNN architectures for
the two datasets separately, because CIFAR-10 is a more
complex dataset than MNIST.
a) MNIST: The MNIST dataset is composed of 70,000
grayscale handwritten digits, where 60,000 examples are used
for training, and 10,000 are used for testing. Each image has
a resolution of 28x28. The digits have been size-normalized
and centered in a fixed-size image [27]. Fig. 7 depicts the
CNN network architecture used in the baseline models for
the MNIST dataset. The figure shows the sequence of the
layers of the network architectures of the baseline models.
The network accepts 28 × 28 input images. The convolutional
layer (layer 2) uses 32, 3 × 3 filters with stride 1 followed
by a second convolutional layer (layer 3) which uses 64, 3
× 3 filters with stride 1. Both layer 2 and 3 use ReLU as
the activation function. The output of layer 3 is subjected to a
max pooling layer with 2×2 max pools. Thus, the max pooling
layer outputs a 12×12×64 tensor for each image. Next, the
output of the max pooling layer is subjected to a dropout
of 25% (layer 5) and flattened (layer 6) to a 1-D vector of
size 9216. The output of the flattening layer is fed into a
fully connected layer (layer 7) with 128 neurons with ReLU
activation function, followed by a dropout of 50%. The output
of the dropout layer is finally fed into a fully connected layer
with 10 neurons which produces the final output of the CNN
network. This model (NPCNN) achieves 99.25% training and
98.16% testing accuracies after 12 epochs of training with a
batch size of 128 using the Adadelta optimization algorithm.
b) DPCNN for MNIST: The DPCNN has an additional
layer: LATENT (layer number 6, colored in yellow) of ran-
domization in between the convolutional module and the
FC module. The green square represents the convolutional
module, and the orange square represents the DPFC module.
If the LATENT layer uses 10 bits to represent one element
(one output of the flattening layer) coming from the fattening
layer, the length of the randomized bit string generated by the
LATENT layer is equal to 10 times the number of outputs of
the flattening layer. In this case, the length of the randomized
bit string will be equal to 9216 × 10 = 92160. The green
arrows are used to indicate that the same configuration of
the corresponding layer is available in the DPCNN. The red
cross is used to indicate that the corresponding layer was
omitted from the DPCNN. As shown in the figure, we do
not use dropouts in the convolutional module of the DPCNN,
as the convolutional module is not trained for the input
features, which is explained in Section III-A. In the DPCNN
experiments with the MNIST dataset, we maintained a fixed
size of 10 bits to represent each output of the flattening layer.
The 10 bits are composed of 4 bits for the whole number, 5
bits for the fraction and 1 bit for the sign.
TABLE I: List of values applied for each hyperparameter in
the test case generation process of hyperparameter tuning
Hyperparameter Hyperparameter settingsfor MNIST
Hyperparameter settings
for CIFAR-10
percentage dropout layer 8 =>{20%, 40%, 50%}
layer 11 =>
{20%, 40%, 50%}
batch size { 128, 256, 512} {400, 500, 600}
activation function layer 7=>{relu, tanh, sigmoid}
layer 10=>
{relu, tanh, sigmoid}
the number of neurons layer 7=>{64, 128, 256, 512}
layer 10=>
{256, 512, 1024}
number of epochs {50, 100, 150} {100, 200, 300}
optimizer {SGD, Adadelta, Adam} {SGD, Adadelta, Adam}
c) CIFAR-10: The CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 60000
color images and 10 classes (airplane, automobile, bird, cat,
deer, dog, frog, horse, ship, and truck), with 6000 images
per class. There are 50000 training images and 10000 testing
images. Each image has a resolution of 32×32 [1]. Fig. 8
depicts the CNN architecture used in the baseline models for
the CIFAR-10 dataset. As CIFAR-10 is a complex dataset
compared to MNIST, for CIFAR-10 we considered a more
complex CNN architecture which involves more layers and
more neurons. The network accepts 32 × 32, 3 channel input
images. The convolutional layer (layer 2) uses 32, 3 × 3 filters
with stride 1 followed by a second convolutional layer (layer
3) which uses 32, 3 × 3 filters with stride 1. Both layers
2 and 3 use ReLU as the activation function. The output of
layer 3 is subjected to a max pooling layer with 2×2 max
pools. The output of layer 4 is fed to a dropout layer (layer 5)
with 25% dropout. The output of layer 5 was subjected to two
other convolutional layers (layer 6 and 7) which use 64, 3×3
filters. The output of layer 6 was next introduced with a max
pooling layer (layer 8) with 2×2 max pools. Thus, the max
pooling layer outputs a 6×6×64 tensor for each image. Next,
the output of the max pooling layer is subjected to a dropout
of 25% (layer 9), and flattened (layer 10) to a 1-D vector
of size 2304. The output of the flattening layer is fed into a
fully connected layer (layer 11) with 512 neurons with ReLU
activation function, followed by a dropout of 50%. The output
of the dropout layer is finally fed into a fully connected layer
with 10 neurons which produces the final output of the CNN
network. This model (NPCNN) achieves 73.32% training and
78.75% testing accuracies after 100 epochs of training for a
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batch size of 32 using the Adadelta optimization algorithm.
d) DPCNN for CIFAR-10: The right-hand side figure of
Fig. 8 represents the DPCNN for the CIFAR-10 dataset. The
DPCNN model creation follows the same approach explained
under the model creation process for the MNIST dataset.
However, we increased the resolution of the images to 56×56
to enhance the features. As a result of that, the input layer
(layer 1) was customized to accept 56×56, 3 channel input
images. We do not use dropouts in the convolutional module
for reasons explained in Section III-A. In the experiments with
the DPCNN model for the CIFAR-10 dataset, we maintained
a fixed size of 10 bits to represent each output of the flattening
layer. The 10 bits are composed of 2 bits for the whole number,
7 bits for the fraction and 1 bit for the sign.
2) Hyperparameter tuning and regularization: As ex-
plained in Section III-A, we conducted the training only on
the FC module. Therefore, we apply hyperparameter tuning
and regularization only on the FC module. Given the number
of possible values for each hyperparameter, the number of
test cases can become large, and it may entail a substantial
computational cost with exponential time. Therefore, it can be
imperative to use insights such as used by [1] to minimize
the number of hyperparameter settings that need to be tested.
Since LATENT does not change the internal parameters of the
FC module, the architectural modifications necessary can be
thought of as an independent procedure that can be common in
any ANN training process. Consequently, we tested different
combinations for percentage dropouts, batch sizes, activation
functions, number of neurons, optimizers, number of epochs,
for the hyperparameter tuning process as given in Table I.
The values used for the hyperparameters during the HPT
processes with each dataset (MNIST and CIFAR-10) are given
in Table I. We preferred higher number of neurons and epochs
for CIFAR-10 due to its complexity compared to MNIST.
During the hyperparameter tuning process, the probability of
preserving the true value of an original bit (p) was set to 1,
which corresponds to the nonprivate state of LATENT. When
p=1, the binary feature vectors will not be randomized, and
the model will result in greater accuracy than when p<1. Due
to the enlarged feature space compared to the conventional 1-
D output of the flattening layer, the input features will have
more representative properties. These properties will allow
the proposed architecture of CNN to generate better accuracy
than that of the original CNN architecture without LATENT.
We generated the test cases using combinations of parameter
values. We applied k-fold cross-validation (k=10) on each
test case to derive a fair set of accuracy results. Since the
search space is large, we divided the list of test cases into
nine groups based on the combinations of the optimizers and
the activation function. The best parameter values returned
for each dataset are colored in red in Table I. Next, we used
the best parameters returned by the tuning process to produce
differentially private models (for MNIST and CIFAR-10) with
the best performance. We used the final DPCNN models of the
hyperparameter tuning process to carry out further experiments
and analyses.
(a) FC module training with α = 5 (b) FC module training with α = 6
(c) FC module training with α = 7 (d) FC module training with α = 8
Fig. 9: The model convergence of the FC module for the
MNIST dataset (under ε = 0.5 and the chosen hyper-
parameters which are red-colored in Table I for MNIST) under
different α values (randomization levels)
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Fig. 10: Change of accuracy of LATENT against ε
3) Image augmentation to improve robustness of the
DPCNN trained using CIFAR-10 : Although we could im-
prove the accuracy of the DPCNN for CIFAR-10 using hy-
perparameter tuning, the model was still not performing well
and tended to overfit. To improve the model robustness, we
applied image augmentation and generated 150,000 additional
augmented images using the 50,000 training input images.
Each augmented image was generated by applying a random
horizontal shift of a 0.1 fraction of the total width, a random
vertical shift of a 0.1 fraction of the total height, a random
rotation of 10 degrees, and a random horizontal flip, on the
original input images. After introducing the new augmented
images, the DPFC module stopped overfitting and started
generating a training accuracy of around 98% and a testing
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accuracy of about 95% consistently for repeated attempts
(under a randomization probability of 1).
4) Selection of ε: As we discussed in Section III-A, the
probability of randomization can be given by Equation (6).
When l = 10 for the DPCNN architecture defined for the
MNIST dataset (depicted in Fig. 7), p = e
ε/92160
1+eε/92160 as the
sensitivity of the DP mechanism is 92160. For the DPCNN
defined for the CIFAR-10 dataset (depicted in Fig. 8) also,
p = e
ε/92160
1+eε/92160 , since the sensitivity is 92160 due to the
increased resolution of the input images from 32×32 to 56×56.
Because of the large sensitivity, the effect of ε in generating
the randomization probabilities is low. When α is maintained
at 1, the probability of randomization (p) lies around 0.5 for
the acceptable values of ε (less than 10) as the sensitivity of
the processes for both models are large (refer Eq. 9). Hence,
we used ε = 0.5 to generate the results in the experiments. We
maintained α at 7 (unless mentioned otherwise), which was
the lowest α value that generated reliable convergence of the
models.
Figure 9 shows the model convergence against different
α values against the number of epochs during the training
process of the FC module on the MNIST dataset when ε = 0.5.
The FC module converges at different number of epochs
against the different levels of randomizations introduced by the
various values of α. The converged models provide excellent
training and testing accuracies as shown in the plots of Figure
9. Clarity of the MNIST dataset and the availability of a
large feature space generated by LATENT allow the model
to produce excellent accuracies: around 98-99% for training
and around 95-96% for testing even at very low ε values such
as 0.5 and α > 5 under the chosen hyper-parameters which
are red-colored in Table I.
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Fig. 11: The change of accuracy vs. the number of epochs
during the training of the DPFC module for the CIFAR-10
dataset (under ε = 0.5 and the chosen hyper-parameters which
are red-colored in Table I for CIFAR-10)
Fig. 11 shows the change of accuracy against the number
of epochs during the training process of the FC module of the
CIFAR-10 dataset when ε = 0.5. After increasing the input
image resolution and applying image augmentation to generate
150,000 new images under the best-chosen hyper-parameters
(red-colored in Table I), the trained model returned around
95-96% training accuracy and about 90-91% testing accuracy
after 50 epochs. The significant feature space generated by
LATENT, and the large input space created by image aug-
mentation allow the final model to produce the corresponding
excellent accuracies with high robustness of the DPFC model.
Fig. 10 shows the change of accuracy against ε values.
As the figure depicts, accuracy is almost constant although
ε is changed. Recall that the probability of randomization is
loosely affected by small values of ε (when α is constant) due
to the high sensitivity values. When α is kept constant (=7),
LATENT maintains a uniform level of randomization on each
dataset under each case of ε depicted in Fig. 10 and produces
similar accuracy for smaller values of ε (< 10).
B. Comparison of the Results of LATENT Against the Existing
Approaches
We compare our results with two other existing differen-
tially private mechanisms for deep learning, as shown in Table
II. Although [SS15] [8] provides good accuracy; ε is presented
as a parameter of the model. It can accumulate a large, unac-
ceptable ε value at the end of model generation as there can
be more than 1000 model parameters. For ε = 2 and δ = 10−5
the [ACG+16] [1] method provides good accuracy, yet the
additive bound of δ can become unreliable when the method is
used for much larger datasets. [ACG+16] has failed to generate
acceptable accuracy for the CIFAR-10 dataset in an extreme
case like ε = 0.5. Our method provides much better accuracy
for an extremely small privacy budget, such as ε = 0.5. Also,
the unavailability of additive bound ensures that our method
has a low privacy leak when substantially large input datasets
are presented to the method. Both [SS15] and [ACG+16] are
based on global differential privacy. Therefore, the availability
of a trusted party is unavoidable. For a real-world scenario,
often we don’t have any trusted party. LATENT can be a much
better solution in such cases, as it works with both untrusted
and trusted curators. Table III sums up the advantages of
LATENT over the existing GDP methods for deep learning.
C. Computational Complexity and Computational Burden on
Generic Users
In this section, we investigate the computational complexity
of the proposed algorithm and its burden on a resource
constrained computer. For these two experiments, we used
a MacBook Pro (macOS Mojave, 13-inch, 2017) personnel
computer (PC) with Intel Core i5 CPU (2.3 GHz), 8 GB
RAM and 1536MB GPU (Intel Iris Plus Graphics), with the
assumption that a general purpose computer is enough to work
as an aggregator in a multi-sensor setup.
LATENT involves two main steps that govern its computa-
tion complexity: (1) binary conversion and (2) randomization
of the convolutional module output. Each digit in the con-
volutional module output is subjected to binary conversion
according to Eq. 5. The parameters of the binary conversion
(m and n, refer to Eq. 5) are fixed at the beginning of
Algorithm 1. Therefore, the computational complexity of the
binary conversion step depends on the number of digits (l)
in the convolutional output. The computational complexity of
step 1 (binary conversion) can be derived as O(l), i.e. is linear.
This can be emperically proven by Fig. 12a. The length of the
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TABLE II: Accuracy comparison of the results of LATENT against the existing methods
Dataset NPCNN [SS15] [8] [ACG+16] [1] LATENT
accuracy of
the model
without privacy
ε is large
as it is reported
per parameter
ε = 2
δ = 10−5
ε = 0.5
δ = 10−5 ε = 2 ε = 0.5
MNIST Training 99.25% N/A ∼95% ∼89% 98.46% 98.97%Testing 98.16% 98% 95% 90% 95.67% 96.37%
CIFAR-10 Training 73.32% N/A ∼68% N/A 95.62% 95.01%Testing 78.75% N/A 67% N/A 91.34% 91.47%
binary string is determined by the values intialized to m and n.
An l sized vector will produce a bit string of l×(m+n+1) (refer
to Section III-A3). Given that the randomization of each bit is
independent, the complexity of the randomization step is also
governed by l, which introduces a computational complexity
of O(l) as represented by Fig. 12b.
(a) Time consumption (in seconds)
for binary encoding.
(b) Time consumption (in seconds)
for randomization
Fig. 12: Time consumption analysis for the binary encoding
and randomization steps of LATENT against the number of
digits generated by the convolutional module.
In the proposed modular decomposition of the CNN archi-
tecture, the convolutional module and the LATENT module
run on the data owner’s machine. We need to make sure
that the convolutional module and LATENT operations do not
impose a substantial computational burden on the resource-
constrained data owners. In order to check this, we measured
the time consumption for the perturbation of a single record of
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets separately. It took an average
time of 0.1655 seconds to perturb a single record of MNIST
dataset while consuming 0.0374 seconds to perturb a single
record of CIFAR-10 dataset. This indicates that a general
purpose computer with moderate specification will suffice
for generating the randomized data. We can conclude that
the convolutional module and the randomization module of
LATENT are feasible to be implemented in any IoT setting or
equivalent in the cloud environment.
V. RELATED WORK
Privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM) provides the ca-
pability of using data mining techniques without disclosing
private information of the participating entities in the un-
derlying database. However, the main challenge in PPDM is
countering the capabilities of skilled adversaries [28], [29]. To
overcome this challenge, PPDM uses data modification (data
perturbation) [30], [31] and encryption [32] techniques. Data
TABLE III: Advantages of LATENT over the existing GDP
methods for deep learning
GDP methods LATENT
Always needs a trusted curator.
LATENT can be used for
both trusted
and untrusted settings.
For machine learning with
cloud computing, original
data needs to be uploaded
to the server considering
the server is trustable.
However, the servers cannot
always be trusted.
LATENT randomizes data
before uploading
them to the server
in case the server is not
trustable.
A higher privacy loss (a larger
privacy budg et - ε) needs to be
allocated to obtain a better utility.
LATENT provides excellent
utility in terms of
classification accuracy
(more than 90%)
even under an extreme
level of randomization
(ε = 0.5).
GDP runs either in client
side or a server side.
The distrust of the server
might prevent the algorithm
being run on a server. However,
deep learning algorithms
tend to be complex and can
be complex for a general
purpose personal computer, and
privacy preservation techniques
often add more complexity. This
feature reduces the practicality
of GDP algorithms for
deep learning.
As LATENT is an LDP
algorithm, it doesn’t
have an obligation
to have a trusted curator.
As the proposed architecture
is already a distributed
version which utilizes
the computational power of
data owners and the servers,
LATENT is more practical
compared to GDP approaches.
encryption-based approaches provide good security and accu-
racy. However, cryptographic methods often suffer from high
computational complexity, which makes encryption unsuitable
for large-scale data mining [33]. Compared to encryption,
data perturbation utilizes lower computational complexity,
which makes it effective for big data mining [34]. Noise
addition, geometric transformation, randomization, data con-
densation, hybrid perturbation (i.e. using several perturbation
techniques together) are some examples of data perturbation
techniques [35].
Data perturbation techniques preserve the original format
of the input data or the output results. As a result of
that, data perturbation techniques often allow some privacy
leak [34]. A privacy model defines and identifies the lim-
its of private information protection and disclosure of a
certain perturbation mechanism [36]. Earlier privacy models
include k − anonymity, l − diversity, (α, k) − anonymity,
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t − closeness [37], [38]. It was shown that these models
are vulnerable to different attacks such as minimality at-
tack [39], composition based attacks [40], and foreground
knowledge [41]. These attacks exploit the perturbed data to
reconstruct private information. Differential privacy (DP) is a
strong privacy model that is trusted to provide a better level of
privacy guarantee compared to previous privacy models [42],
[43].
There are different data perturbation approaches to achieve
differential privacy. Laplace mechanism, Gaussian mechanism
[19], geometric mechanism, randomized response [17], and
staircase mechanisms [10] are a few of the fundamental
mechanisms used to achieve differential privacy. There are
many practical examples where these fundamental mecha-
nisms have been used to build differentially private algorithms.
Differential Privacy for SQL Queries [44], LDPMiner [17],
PINQ [45], RAPPOR [14], Succinct histogram [46] and Deep
Learning with Differential Privacy [1] are a few examples of
such practical applications.
Literature shows a few attempts to address the issue of
privacy leaks in deep learning algorithms by imposing private
training [1], [8], [47]–[49]. Shokri, R. et al. [8] developed
a distributed multi-party learning mechanism (referred to as
[SS15] in Table II) for a neural network without sharing input
datasets. They parallelized the learning process, which is based
on the stochastic gradient descent optimization algorithm. In
their method, the privacy loss is calculated per parameter of
the model. This feature can entail a substantial privacy loss as
there are many model parameters, often there can be thousands
of such model parameters. Abadi, M. et al. [1] introduced
an efficient differentially private mechanism (referred to as
[ACG+16] in Table II) based on global differential privacy.
Their model is capable of achieving high efficiency and
performance under a modest privacy budget. Their algorithm is
based on a differentially private version of stochastic gradient
descent, which runs on the TensorFlow software library for
machine learning. Further, they introduced a mechanism to
track privacy loss, the moments accountant, which allows tight
automated analysis of privacy loss. But the additive bound
δ of their (ε,δ)-differential privacy mechanism may incur an
unreliable level of privacy leak when the method is used for
much larger datasets. Another shortcoming of the two methods
[SS15] and [ACG+16] is the need for a trusted third party.
Since both approaches are based on global differential privacy,
the necessity of having a trusted third party cannot be avoided.
This can be considered as a significant issue in applying these
methods to real-world scenarios, where trusted curators are not
always available.
LATENT is designed to be aligned with machine-learning-
as-a-service scenario, which has become popular due to the
capabilities offered by large Internet-based companies, such
as Google and Amazon [3]. For example Google’s cloud-
based machine learning engine provides the ability to build the
models with multiple ML frameworks such as scikit-learn [50],
XGBoost [51], Keras [25], and TensorFlow [3]. LATENT
uses similar technologies for its implementation, replicating
the technical settings of the environment offered by Google’s
cloud ML platform and other related services.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new local differentially private mechanism
to train a deep neural network with high privacy and high
accuracy. Our model exhibits excellent accuracy even under
extremely low privacy budgets (e.g. ε = 0.5) compared to
existing differentially private approaches. We achieve 95%-
96% testing accuracy and 90%-91% testing accuracy for the
MNIST dataset and CIFAR-10 dataset, respectively, with a
high level of privacy (0.5-differential privacy). Due to the large
feature space created by LATENT during the randomization
process, it generates better accuracy for the CIFAR-10 dataset
than the baseline CNN model without any privacy. Exist-
ing differentially private mechanisms are implemented using
global differential privacy, and so they need a trusted curator.
The untrusted curator setting of our approach provides a higher
level of privacy while leaving a low level of computational
burden to the data owners. Moving the convolutional module
to the data owners produces additional privacy even without
the application of randomization as the convolutional module
output is a 1-D dimension-reduced output. The distribution
of the CNN structure between data owners and servers also
increases the flexibility of data processing in the big data con-
text. This distribution also helps LATENT be easily adapted
to innovations such as the amalgamation of SDN and NFV
in edge-cloud interplay. When a large number of data owners
communicate with a single server, the server has to be con-
cerned only about generating the differentially private ANN
model. The ability to use our method in the untrusted curator
setting allows the private sharing of sensitive data and limits
the privacy leak in distributed machine learning scenarios.
Since the proposed method is based on LDP, we do not make
any architectural modifications to the fully connected artificial
neural network component (which we call the FC module)
of a convolutional network. Therefore, the input parameter
selection (e.g. ε, α, and the number of input bits) of the
differentially private component (LATENT) is independent of
the tuning processes (e.g. regularization, image augmentation,
and hyperparameter tuning) of the FC module in the CNN
architecture. This allows easy training and tuning of the FC
module with a higher level of accuracy and an extreme level of
privacy, resulting in an outstanding balance between privacy
and utility.
Our approach opens up many future research directions.
Investigating the possibility of reducing data sensitivity would
be a good research avenue. Low sensitivity would allow
the selection of an appropriate ε value tailored to domain
requirements. We would also like to test our method on other
deep learning architectures such as recurrent networks with
LSTM (Long Short-Term Memory) and test it for other large
datasets to find its performance and generalizability.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF UNARY ENCODING (UE)
Proof. Considering a sensitivity of 2, choose p and q as
follows,
p =
e
ε
2
1 + e ε2
(10)
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q =
1
1 + e ε2
(11)
Pr
[
B |v1
]
Pr
[
B |v2
] = ∏i∈[d] Pr [B[i]|v1]∏
i∈[d] Pr
[
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]
≤ Pr
[
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]
Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v1
]
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
Pr
[
B [v2] = 0|v2
]
=
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q
· 1 − q
1 − p = e
ε
(12)
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF OPTIMIZED UNARY ENCODING (UE)
Proof. Considering a sensitivity of 2, define,
p =
1
2
(13)
q =
1
1 + eε
(14)
Pr
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B |v1
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Pr
[
B |v2
] = ∏i∈[d] Pr [B[i]|v1]∏
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Pr
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]
Pr
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B [v2] = 0|v2
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p
q
· 1 − q
1 − p = e
ε
(15)
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THE UPPER BOUND THEOREM
Proof. Considering a sensitivity of 2, choose p and q of Eq.7
according to Eq.16 and Eq. 17 respectively.
p =
αe
ε
2
1 + αe ε2
(16)
q =
1
1 + αe ε2
(17)
According to Eq. 8, we can write,
ε = ln
©­­­­«
(
αe
ε
2
1+αe
ε
2
) (
1 − 1
1+αe
ε
2
)
(
1 − αe
ε
2
1+αe
ε
2
) (
1
1+αe
ε
2
) ª®®®®¬
ε = ln(α2eε)
(18)
Therefore, UB(ε) = ln(α2eε)
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF MODIFIED OUE (MOUE)
Proof. Considering a sensitivity of 2, let,
p =
1
1 + α
(19)
q =
1
1 + αeε
(20)
Pr
[
B |v1
]
Pr
[
B |v2
] = ∏i∈[d] Pr [B[i]|v1]∏
i∈[d] Pr
[
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1
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α
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)(
1
1+αeε
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF ε-LDP FOR MOUE FOR HIGH SENSITIVITIES
Proof. Given that LATENT has a sensitivity of r × l (refer
Section III-A1), the privacy budget () needs to be divided by
the sensitivity for each bit as proven by RAPPOR. For MOUE,
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= 11+α and Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
= α1+α . Hence,
Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v2
]
=
αe
ε
r l
1 + αe εr l
(22)
Pr
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B [v2] = 0|v2
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1
1 + αe εr l
(23)
Therefore,
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THE ε-LDP OF THE UTILITY ENHANCING
RANDOMIZATION STEP OF LATENT
Proof. Considering a sensitivity of rl, choose the randomiza-
tion probabilities according to Eq. 25.
p(B[i]v) =

Pr
[
B [v1] = 1|v1
]
= α1+α if i ∈ 2n; n ∈ N
Pr
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ε
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ε
r l
”
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]
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[
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]
= αe
ε
r l
1+αe
ε
r l
”
(25)
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